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ABSTRACT 
The ignition source for Buncefield, the United Kingdom’s most severe recent vapour cloud explosion 
(VCE) was potentially electrical control boxes situated inside a pump house immersed in the vapour 
cloud. There are other reports of confined or bang box ignition sources for other VCEs, such as Port 
Hudson and Jaipur where it is proposed these ignition sources were responsible for transition to 
detonation (DDT). There has, however, been relatively little previous research into this type of ignition 
mechanism and its effect on the explosion severity. Commercially available electrical control boxes 
measuring 600 mm high, 400 mm wide and 250 mm deep were used to explore the pressure development, 
venting processes and flame characteristics of stoichiometric propane/air explosions using cling film, 
aluminium foil and the supplied doors as vent coverings. In this work the boxes were empty of their usual 
contents in order to establish a baseline for the effect of the internal congestion of the boxes. It was found 
that, in these empty-box tests the overpressure was dominated by the bursting pressure of the vent-
covering and the external explosion, although clearly presenting significant ignition source to a potential 
surrounding flammable cloud, it produced no significant overpressure. The door produced a flat petal 
shaped flame that differed drastically from the rolling vortex bubble flame shape traditionally associated 
with vented explosions.  
KEYWORDS: VCE, Vapour cloud explosion, vented explosion, bang-box ignition. 
© Crown copyright 2018 
INTRODUCTION 
The most recent severe Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) in the United Kingdom was the Buncefield 
incident in 2005 [1] which, due to the timing of the accident, did not result in any fatalities but 
caused damage exceeding £1 billion. The vapour cloud was a large unconfined, gravity driven 
pancake cloud and the resultant explosion was very severe. This incident was thoroughly 
investigated [2] and has triggered a large quantity of peer reviewed work [2-14],  but remains the 
subject of research focus because of particular features of this event that are not fully explained or 
understood, as discussed below.  
A review of large fuel storage site VCEs by Atkinson et al [15] showed that devastating whole-
cloud explosions resulting from large unconfined vapour clouds are not only a possibility but a 
likely outcome of loss of containment in weather conditions that allow development of a very large, 
fairly homogeneous cloud of vapour. They reported no examples of large flash fire events, which 
would be the traditional risk expectation in low congestion storage depot sites, such as those 
reviewed in this work. The idea of very large homogenous cloud development [10, 16, 17] is also 
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relatively new and not widely understood. Atkinson et al [15] concluded that the the transition to a 
severe explosion regime seems to involve some degree of congestion or confinement. Based on the 
incidents studied the following may have acted as triggers: confined explosions in buildings (e.g. 
pump houses), dense vegetation, pipe racks and other moderately congested plant. The extent and 
density of congestion presented, however was considered as substantially less than that required for 
DDT [15]. 
Buncefield was unusual amongst historical VCEs in having overgrown vegetation in the area where 
transition to a severe explosion occurred; most of the other sites, for which there is very detailed 
forensic evidence, did not have any areas of dense vegetation or indeed any extended areas of 
densely packed pipework. Investigators of VCEs at Jaipur [15,18] and Port Hudson [19] have 
proposed that transition in these cases was the consequence of ignition with nested confined 
volumes e.g. at Port Hudson an industrial freezer within a concrete building submerged in the wider 
vapour cloud.  
Their hypothesis is that failure of the innermost compartment or container would have triggered 
energetic jetting of unburned gas and then flames into the surrounding building. The resulting 
explosion would have been further enhanced by the effect of fragments of the innermost container 
and any other congestion within the building, resulting in a violent confined explosion in this 
second layer of the nested ignition source. Finally, the disintegration of the building within a very 
large cloud would have triggered a still more energetic and much larger explosion in the 
surrounding cloud. It is further proposed that, in the right circumstances, such a series of explosions 
could trigger DDT. 
The Buncefield ignition also occurred within a closed steel electrical control box, inside a congested 
building [3]. The whole building was immersed in the larger unconfined vapour cloud. If the nested 
ignition source mechanism has to be invoked to explain transitions at Jaipur, Amuay and Port 
Hudson then it is possible that this was also the cause at Buncefield. In fact, there is evidence that 
the density of vegetation at Buncefield was well below that which would be necessary to drive run-
up to DDT [15] . 
There has, however, been relatively little research into this type of strong external cloud ignition 
mechanism (nested bang-box) and its effect on the explosion severity, despite calls [8] for further 
research into this aspect after Buncefield. There have been no previous studies of nested ignition 
scenarios where an external cloud was ignited by a vented explosion from the building which in 
turn, was ignited by a vented explosion from the control box. It certainly cannot be ruled out that 
this type of nested ignition event was the primary reason for the transition to a severe explosion in 
most if not all of the historical incidents. This is especially the case if a large homogenous cloud 
covers an area for several tens of minutes; gas ingress into buildings and small volumes containing 
ignition sources is is highly likely over long timescales. 
The research into explosion venting has been carried out exclusively by venting into the 
atmosphere. There is a great deal of useful research into this type of vented explosions [20-24] and a 
number of authors [22-24] have identified various pressures peaks that are associated with the with 
the dynamics of exlosion venting and attempted to define the conditions that would lead to one or 
other of these pressure peaks to the highest during the explosion. 
However, the importance of an initiation of a VCE explosion through the powerful ignition from a 
vented explosion (bang box ignition) has been appreciated since the pioneering work of Harrison 
and Eyre [25], but until recently there has been no systematic investigation of this mechanism of 
VCE initiation. A recent study by Daubech et al. [14] provided some further insights into the 
mechanism of this type of explosion, with both experimental and computational tests. Their 
experimental set up consisted of a 4 m3 chamber connected to an unconfined 54 m3 volume with 
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ignition in the 4 m3 chamber. With smaller vents from the chamber the VCE overpressure was 
measured to be as high as 10 times larger as compared to the fully unconfined case (no bang box).  
The aim of this programme of work is to investigate the effects that an ignition in a congested 
standard industrial closed steel electrical control box will have on the ignition characteristics and 
severity of an explosion in an external volume in a congested space. This paper is the first part of 
that programme, providing base data on the explosion development in empty electrical boxes and 
different vent covers, other than the standard hinged door. The aim was to find a vent cover material 
that would allow multiple tests to determine the worst case scenario for congestion levels inside the 
box, without destroying a large number of boxes in the process. The initial data presented here 
provided some useful insights into the dynamics of flame shape and pressure development initiated 
in electrical control boxes. 
METHODOLOGY 
Commercially available electrical control boxes 600 mm high, 400 mm wide and 250 mm , volume 
0.06 m3, with a 3 point locking mechanism were fitted to the back wall of a 8 m3 frame rig as shown 
in Figs. 1 and 2. The door when fully open had a vent area, Av, of the large side of the box and a 
vent coefficient Kv = V2/3/Av of 0.64 and a ratio of the surface area of the box, As, to Av of 4.08. 
NFPA68 [26] venting guidance predicts a Pred of 1.75 mbar for propane and the European Guidance 
[27] predicts a Pred of 30 mbar by extrapolation, but this is for a 100 mbar vent static burst pressure, 
so the European venting guidance is not valid for the large vent area of this work. It will be should 
that the measured Pred are greater than these design predictions, due to the action of the vent cover 
static burst pressure, Pstat, which is not known in the present work.  
  
Fig. 1. Test rig in-situ with electrical box with door 
on in place ready for testing. 
Fig. 2. Three point locking mechanism of the control 
box doors. 
The left side wall of the box was cut away and replaced with 5 mm polycarbonate for viewing 
purposes. For some of the tests the door was removed using the hinge pin and the opening was 
covered with cling film or aluminium foil. Due to the shape of the box aperture, taping with duct 
tape was the most efficient method of attaching the foil or film membrane. 
Tests were conducted using stoichiometric propane/air mixtures ignited by a TalonTM tungsten hot 
wire firework central ignitor on the back wall of the box. The gas concentration was controlled with 
mass flow controllers. The box was filled by purging the box with pre-mixed gas at the desired 
concentration and monitoring the exhaust with a gas analyser to ensure purging was complete. 
Overpressure measurements were made using fast response pressure transducers, located internally 
Part 4. Gas and Dust Explosions 
359 
and externally to the box, as shown in Fig. 3. Time of flame arrival was recorded using fast response 
thermocouples set at distances from the ignition point of 25 mm, 250 mm (vent), 500 mm and 750 
mm. In some of the tests high-speed (up to 3200 fps) and mid-speed (240 fps) videography was 
taken and from these flame position and flame speed determinations were made. 
 
Fig. 3. Plan view of location of pressure transducers. 
RESULTS 
Dynamics of pressure development and box venting process 
The door had a defined failure mechanism through plastic and elastic deformation of the three point 
locking mechanism, as shown in Fig. 2. The locking pins were held by weak plastic fixings at two 
points, designed to be removable by the user to install sundry items such as locking handles. 
However, in both tests the failure was slightly different; in test 1 both pins were detached from the 
centre and the lower pin completely removed. In test 2 only the top pin was detached from the 
centre and there was an increase of 16-17 % in the internal overpressure. In both tests the door 
started to open before the flame reached it. 
 
(a)                                                          (b) 
Fig. 4. An example of two of the foil failure mechanisms. (a) The foil burst and was almost completely 
detached (test 4). (b) The failure started as the tape detached from the side in the early stage of the event, the 
foil then tore from this point along the centre (test 3). 
In the foil tests, the way they burst was variable and the random size of the hole left by the venting 
process influenced the internal overpressure. In test 3 approximately 50 % of the vent was removed 
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and in test 4 nearly all the vent was removed. On analysis of the explosion video it is apparent that 
the hole size depends on the strength of the foil fixing. In test 4 the foil burst rather than tore, as 
shown in Fig. 4a; in test e the tape detached from the side of the aperture in the early stages of the 
event, before the flame exit and the foil started to tear in this area, as shown in Fig. 4b. Fig. 4 shows 
for both explosions that when the flame leaves the vessel and bursts the vent, it is still well away 
from the side walls. The flame propagates in the direction of the vent, even for this vessel with a 
very sort distance from the spark to the vent cover. 
In Test 4 the venting process with foil was rather similar to that for a door with a vertical crack 
appearing down the edge of the box closest to PT3. Following the rapid development of the crack 
the central parts of the foil near the opening was effectively unrestrained. The foil is light and 
rapidly accelerates to match the velocity of the gases emerging from the fissure.  
 
 
            (a)                                  (b)                                   (c)                                   (d) 
Fig 5. Test 2. Pressure and flame transit trace. Photo (a) showing flame start. Photo (b) showing partial venting 
as door distorts. Photo (c) showing beginning of full venting. Photo (d) showing flame exit. 
The pressure records of Tests 2 and 4 are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, which demonstrate that for 
both the door and the foil vent the vent burst pressure dominated the overpressure and other 
pressure peaks were not significant. The Pred in Fig. 5 were much higher at 90 mbar than those 
predicted from venting standards at < 2, mbar for NFPA 68 [26]. The initial pressure rise of test 2, 
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(Fig. 5) and test 4 (Fig. 6) is at a similar rate, but in test 2 as the door opens it deflects at the top and 
venting begins with a much lower open area than when the vent is full open. The pressure rise stalls 
as the vent is opening further. This causes a slight delay (~15ms) in reaching the bursting point of 
the door, compared to the bursting point of the foil in test 4. There is also a reduction in flame speed 
within the box in test 2 compared to test 4, which is due to the early partial venting of the door 
compared to the foil vent cover. In test 2 the flame exits before the peak pressure is achieved, in test 
4 the flame exits after the vent has burst and the pressure within the box is relieved. In test 2, as the 
door is still in front of the vent as the flame exits, the flame is distorted and diverted away from the 
external thermocouples. In test 4 acceleration of the flame externally can be seen. 
 
 
     (a)                         (b)                                                 (c) 
Fig 6. Test 4. Pressure and flame transit trace. Photo (a) showing flame start. Photo (b) showimg flame 
transiting vent. Photo (c) showing flame 500 mm from vent, 750 mm from ignition source. 
Measurements from high speed video of the vent failure in Test 4 indicated an initial foil 
displacement speed of 20 m/s. The internal pressure in the vented explosion when the vent burst was 
97 mbar which, assuming a dynamic head, pressure loss at the vent would correspond to a mean 
vent area flow speed of 122 m/s. This initial pressure is only developed across a small open area and 
diminishes to about 5 mbar as the vent opens further. The rapid vent pressure relief is followed by 
small pressure oscillations and these are also registered further out, but these are not significant.  
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In the cling film test the membrane stretched ahead of the flame until it burst on the TC3. As the 
film is stretched and thins, surface defects, such striations caused in manufacture, are likely to have 
an increasing influence on bursting or tearing. This failure mechanism and the associated pressures 
were so different from the behaviour with a door or foil vent cover, that this method of vent cover 
was abandoned. 
Flame characteristics 
What is of interest in the results of these tests is the vented flame structure. In the door tests the 
vented flame shape was consistently a flat petal shaped (Fig. 7a and b).  In test 4 the flame shape 
was a rolling vortex bubble (Fig. 7c), which induced little turbulence to the external volume, as 
detailed by Daubech et al. [14]. In test 3 the vented flame shape was broken down into a jet (Fig. 
7d), but the flame took 44 ms to travel 500 mm from the vent, compared to 30 ms for test 4 and the 
jet was only established in the latter part of the event.   
 
(a)                                                                             (b) 
 
(c)                                                                             (d) 
Fig. 7. Vented flame shapes witnessed in testing - test 1 (a) and (b), test 4 (c) and test 3 (d). 
Maximum pressures and flame speeds 
Table 1 shows for overpressure measurements; PT2 and PT3. The results for PT4 were identical to 
PT1. Figure 5 and Fig. 6 show pressure time traces for tests 2 and 4. The cling film vent cover 
results are clearly lower than the vent covers as they do not have a defined bursting pressure due to 
their stretching. The foil Pred were similar to those of the door, in spite of the differences in the 
pressure time characteristics in Fig. 5. On this basis it is recommended that the foil cover is a 
reasonable basis to investigate the influence of obstacles in the electrical box in future work. 
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Replacing the complete box so that new doors can be tested is expensive, as 100+ explosion 
configurations are planned for this future work. 
Table 1. Results of ovepressure measurements 
Test Vent covering PT1 (mbar) PT2 (mbar) PT3 (mbar) 
1 door 78 2 4 
2 door 90 4 7 
3 foil 72 3 3 
4 foil 97 5 5 
5 cling film 9 >1 >1 
6 cling film 15 2 2 
Table 2 details the flame transit time measured from TC1. The results from the external 
thermocouples for test 6 may be anomalous as the cling film expanded to a point that it burst on 
TC3, moving it and potentially thermally isolating it from the flame temporarily. The average flame 
speed inside the box is close to the spherical laminar flame speed of about 3 m/s for propane. The 
flame speed downstream of the vent is much higher due to the turbulence induced by the vent 
bursting. However, these flame speeds are much lower than those measured by Fakandu et al. [23] 
for a 10L vented vessel with end ignition and an open vent. All these flame speeds are too low to 
give significant dynamic over-pressures. However, the flame size shown in Figs. 6 will give a 
strong ignition source when there is an external cloud around the vessel. 
Table 2. Flame transit times from TC1 
Test Vent 
covering 
TC2  
(ms) 
Average 
flame speed 
(m/s) 
TC3 
(ms) 
Average 
flame Speed 
(m/s) 
TC4 
(ms) 
Average 
flame Speed 
(m/s) 
2 door 53 4.25 - - - - 
3 Foil 44 5.11 69 10 88 13.15 
4 foil 51 4.41 65 17.86 81 15.65 
6 cling film 44 5.11 92 5.21 97 50 
CONCLUSIONS 
The dominating factor for the internal overpressure was the vent burst pressure for these very large 
vent area explosions. This effect has been documented before by Fakandu et al. [23], who reported a 
proportional correlation for different gases between static bursting pressure of the membrane and 
the dynamic bursting pressure during an explosion in a small volume vessel (10 litre). Their vessel 
was elongated with a L/D of 2.8. The boxes in these tests are a larger volume (60 litre), with a 
different geometry and an L/D of 0.34 and the size of the vent would make determining static 
bursting pressure difficult, especially with the door.  
The door has different failure mechanism to the foil, when applied strongly; the foil bursts and rips 
open and is removed from the full area of the vent, whereas the door hinges open and obstructs the 
vent during flame exit. The foil rupture opens quickly and moves easily out of the way of the flame 
exit.  But in both tests the vent area is increasing during the venting, the full vent area is not exposed 
immediately. The external overpressures were either very low or non-existent. There is also the 
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potential that the failure mechanisms of the vent covers may have an effect at a larger scale. Earlier 
work in this programme [28] has demonstrated that steel cladded panels on a building can act as 
turbulence-inducing congestion as they hinge open during an explosion and severely increase the 
overpressures produced in the event. 
The explosions in the boxes with the door do not produce the rolling vortex flame shape seen by 
Daubech et al [14], and seen in test 4, a flat petal shape is produced. What is a not known is how the 
flat flame shape and overpressures produced by these explosions affect the ignition mechanisms in 
an external volume, but this is the focus of a later stage in the programme. As the door opens in the 
early stages of the explosion unburned gas is forced through the gap in the door creating turbulence. 
If this is vented into a flammable external volume there will be a larger external explosion, which is 
the subject of future work.  
In tests 1 and 2 the door remained attached to the hinges. The door on the box, proposed as the 
ignition source for Buncefield, was detached and travelled some distance and the box was distorted 
from the internal overpressure [3]. It should be noted that these test were, conducted with new high 
quality, strong boxes that are constructed with pressed mild steel but have a relatively weak locking 
mechanism and had no congestion. The box at Buncefield was highly congested. Further work will 
be carried out in this programme to look at the effects of differing congestion levels.  
Cling film does not seem to be a valid method for further testing due to its behaviour when heat and 
pressure are applied. If the foil, strongly attached and bursts, the burst pressure appears to be 
slightly higher than the door. It does suggest that a foil membrane is a valid method for further tests 
to investigate the effect of added congestion in the boxes on flame speeds and overpressures. But 
when addressing a bang box effect, standard vented explosions with cover other than the doors 
probably can’t be used to substitute for the door fronted boxes, because of the significantly different 
external flame shapes which will form the ignition source of the external cloud. 
DISCLAIMER  
This paper and the work it describes were funded by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Its 
contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors alone and do 
not necessarily reflect HSE policy. 
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